w B. Or one might want A to confirm A & B but not want A _ B to confirm A (since A _ B might in its turn be confirmed by B).
In this note, I show that this difficulty is of a quite general nature and does not simply arise from the desire to have the content of A be part of the content of A & B but not have the content of A _ B be part of the content 20 of A. For there are three general requirements one might wish to impose on the relation of partial content. The first is that it should hold -or, at least, be capable of holding -in virtue of logical form. Thus, if the content of C is part of the content of A and C 0 and A 0 are obtained by uniform substitution from C and A, then the content of C 0 should also be part of the content of A 0 . I call
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this Substitution. The second is that whether one statement C is part of the content of another A should be indifferent to their logical formulation. Thus, if C 0 is logically equivalent to C and A 0 to A then the content of C 0 should also be part of the content of A 0 . I call this Equivalence. The third is that the relation should be capable of non-trivial application: we require at least one 30 case in which the content of C is part of the content of A and yet A is not a contradiction, C is not a tautology, and C is a proper logical consequence of A; and we require at least one case in which C is not part of the content of A and yet C is a logical consequence of A. I call this Non-Triviality. It is this last requirement which is the generalization of the more particular requirement 35 that the content of A be included in that of A & B even though the content of A _ B is not included in the content of A.
It can be shown that when we allow the statements A and C to be formed by means of the usual truth-functional connectives and when logical equivalence is taken to be classical equivalence, that is equivalence according to classical There are a number of possible reactions to this result. One is defeatist. It is to give up on the notion of partial content and perhaps also of the related notions of partial truth and confirmation. This is a response of last resort and I, personally, would be loathe to make it. I feel that philosophers are often far too ready to declare a notion incoherent on general theoretical grounds, without any real appreciation of how problematic those grounds might be.
Another possible reaction is to give up Non-Triviality. But the notion of partial content would then largely lose its interest. For presumably, we only want the content of C to be part of the content of A when it is a logical 15 consequence of A. But suppose that there is no case in which the content of C is not part of the content of A and yet C is a logical consequence of A. Partial content and logical consequence would then coincide and so the notion of partial content would have no independent interest. Suppose now that there were no cases in which the content of C is part of the content of A and yet A 20 is not a contradiction, C is not a tautology and C is a proper logical consequence of A. Then, every case of the content of C being part of the content of A is either one in which A is a contradiction or C is a tautology or A and C are logically equivalent; and so even though partial content and logical consequence need not coincide, there would still be no interesting cases in which 25 the content of C was part of the content of A.
A third reaction is anti-structural. Partial content is not a matter of logical form and so Substitution should be given up. One problem with this response is that it is always possible to guarantee Substitution by stipulation. For suppose, we have a notion of partial content that does not satisfy
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Substitution. Then, we may define the content of C to be part of the content of A whenever the content of C 0 is part of the content of A 0 , in the original sense of partial content, for any substitution instances C 0 , A 0 of C, A. Partial content is, in effect, partial content in virtue of logical form. And if the notion is redefined in this way, then the response will presumably take the form of 35 rejecting Non-Triviality; there are no non-trivial cases of one statement being a partial content of another in virtue of logical form.
We have already found reason to object to the rejection of Non-Triviality. But our previous objections no longer apply. For even though the defined up structural notion of partial content may not admit of any interesting cases, 40 the original non-structural notion may. We may allow, for example, that the content of p is part of the content of (p & q) for atomic statements p and q while denying that the content of p _ q is part of the content of p.
The difficulty with this response is to justify the invidious attitude towards atomic and non-atomic statements. Presumably, if the content of p is part of the content of (p & q) then the content of $p is part of the content of $p & $q and the content of (p & q) is part of the content of (p & q)^r, while the 5 content of (p _ q) is not part of the content of (p _ q) & p (equivalent to p) and nor is the content of $(p & q) (equivalent to $p _ $q) part of the content of $(p & q) & $p (equivalent to $p). But then why is the principle applicable to the negations of atomic statements and to the conjunctions of atomic statements and yet not to the disjunction of atomic statements or even 10 to the negations of their conjunction? What is it that we lose in forming a disjunction or a negation of a conjunction that we do not lose in forming a conjunction or a simple negation?
Presumably, the principle that the content of A is part of the content of A & B will only be true, in general, when the content of A and of B is not 'disjunct-15 ive' and the content of $A will only be non-disjunctive, in general, when the content of A is not 'conjunctive'; and so it is only because we take the content of the atomic statements to be neither conjunctive nor disjunctive that we can allow A to be part of the content of A & B when A and B are atomic statements or their negations or the conjunctions of atomic statements or their negations 20 but not when A and B are the negations of such conjunctions.
This line of defence therefore requires that we distinguish between conjunctive and disjunctive statements, not at the level of language, but at the level of content. I do not want to say that this cannot be done but it raises severe problems and calls for much more in the way of argument than is 25 generally acknowledged.
A more modest form of response along these lines is to hold that there are no non-trivial cases of partial content that hold in virtue of logical form (as with p being part of the content of p & q) but still to allow that there may be non-trivial cases that hold in virtue of 'meaning', as with 'his arm went up' 30 being part of the content of 'he raised his arm'. Part of the problem with this response is that we lose the examples that originally helped motivate the concept of partial content. We wanted to say that the content of A was in general part of the content of A & B but that the content of A _ B was not in general part of the content of A. But what now becomes of this motivating 35 idea? This response may not be defeatist; but it is hard to see why someone who makes it should not be defeatist.
A final reaction is anti-classical. We give up the assumption that partial content is preserved under logical equivalence. This assumption has usually been regarded as inviolable. For surely partial content is a matter of truth-40 conditional content; and surely the truth-conditional content of logical equivalents is the same. I myself think that this objection can be answered, since there is a perfectly natural (perhaps more natural) conception of truth-conditional content under which the truth-conditional content of classical equivalents may not be the same (as argued towards the end of Fine 2012). a note on partial content | 3 But rather than pursuing this line of argument here, let me mention another, more speculative, consideration in favour of the anti-classical response. The judgement that partial content should be preserved under logical equivalence is highly theoretical and derives from adopting a classical con-ception of content. On the other hand, the judgements that the content of A is part of the content of A & B and that the content of A _ B is not in general part of the content of A are highly intuitive and are not based on any particular idea of what the content of A & B or of A _ B should be taken to be. Given a conflict between the theoretical and the intuitive judgements, 10 there is something to be said for going with the intuitive judgements, which are much more likely to lead us to the essential idea of partial content without the disturbance which results from accepting a particular conception of what the content must be. I believe that, once this strategy is pursued, it will lead to a notion of partial content that is subject to Substitution though 15 not to Equivalence and the more classical notion of partial content can then be seen to emerge from the attempt to impose a classical conception of content upon a notion that is more naturally understood against the background of a non-classical conception.
Formal appendix
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Let L be the language of truth-functional logic. We use j-for classical (truthfunctional) consequence and -j-for classical equivalence. A formula is said to be contingent if both it and its negation are satisfiable. S is said to be a state description in the sentence letters p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , n ! 0, if it is of the form q 1 & q 2 & . . . & q n , where each q i , for i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n, is either p i or $p i .
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We take > (partial content) to be a relation on the formulas of L and consider the following rules on >:
Non-Triviality (P) A > C holds for some contingent A and C for 30 which A j-C but not C j-A (N) A > C fails for some A and C for which A j-C We read the rules conditionally so that Substitution, for example, says that A 0 > C 0 whenever A > C.
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The proof of impossibility rests on two reductions: Lemma (First Reduction) Suppose the relation < on L satisfies Equivalence and Substitution. Then, p > (p _ q) implies A > C whenever A j-C.
Proof Suppose that > satisfies Equivalence and Substitution and that p > (p _ q). Take any A and C for which A j-C. Then, A > C. For upon substituting A for p and C for q, it follows that A > (A _ C) by Substitution. But (A _ C) -j-C; and so A > C by Equivalence.
Lemma (Second Reduction) Suppose that S 1 , . . . , S l , S l þ 1 , . . . , S m are 5 distinct state-descriptions in the sentence letters p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n , with 0 < l < m < 2 n , and that > is a relation on L satisfying Substitution and Equivalence. Then, (S 1 _ . . .
Proof Without loss of generality, we can assume that the state-descrip- It is clear from the construction that v j must be one of the disjuncts attached to S j , j ¼ 1, 2, . . . , m. It should also be clear that v k cannot be one The impossibility result is sensitive both to the underlying language L and to the underlying logic on L. It does not hold for classical predicate logic, for 25 example. For take A > C to hold when C is a classical consequence of A and A is a finite consequence of C, that is, A is true in any finite model in which C is true. Then, it may be shown that all three conditions are satisfied. In particular, Non-Triviality holds. For let '(R) be a formula which says that R is a partial strict order without last element. Then, Positive Non-
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Triviality is satisfied upon letting A ¼ '(R) & p and C ¼ '(R), while Negative Non-Triviality is satisfied upon letting A ¼ p and C ¼ p _ q. Nor does the result hold for intuitionistic sentential logic (or many other subsystems of classical logic). For take A > C to hold when C is an intuitionistic consequence of A and A is a classical consequence of C. Then, Positive Non-
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Triviality, in particular, is satisfied upon letting A ¼ p and C ¼ $$p, while Negative Non-Triviality is satisfied, as before, upon letting A ¼ p and C ¼ p _ q. Nor does the result hold for the modal logic T (or any normal extension of it in which the modalities do not collapse). For take A > C to hold when A ' oeC is a theorem of T. Then, Positive Non-Triviality is satisfied 40 upon letting A ¼ oep and C ¼ p while Negative Non-Triviality is satisfied upon letting A ¼ C ¼ p.
These counterexamples to the impossibility result are not likely to be of an succour to the proponent of partial content, but I do not know of any reasonable extension of the result whereby they might be excluded. 
